Dispersed Behavior and Perceptions in Assortative Societies by Frick, Mira et al.
Yale University 
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale 
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers Cowles Foundation 
4-1-2018 




Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Frick, Mira; Iijima, Ryota; and Ishii, Yuhta, "Dispersed Behavior and Perceptions in Assortative Societies" 
(2018). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 145. 
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/145 
This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Cowles Foundation at EliScholar – A 
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cowles Foundation 
Discussion Papers by an authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at 
Yale. For more information, please contact elischolar@yale.edu. 
By
COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO.
COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
YALE UNIVERSITY
Box 208281
New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8281
http://cowles.yale.edu/
DISPERSED BEHAVIOR AND PERCEPTIONS IN ASSORTATIVE SOCIETIES




Dispersed Behavior and Perceptions in Assortative
Societies∗
Mira Frick Ryota Iijima Yuhta Ishii
Abstract
We take an equilibrium-based approach to study the interplay between behavior and
misperceptions in coordination games with assortative interactions. Our focus is assorta-
tivity neglect, where agents fail to take into account the extent of assortativity in society.
We show, first, that assortativity neglect amplifies action dispersion, both in fixed societies
and by exacerbating the effect of social changes. Second, unlike other misperceptions, as-
sortativity neglect is a misperception that agents can rationalize in any true environment.
Finally, assortativity neglect provides a lens through which to understand how empirically
documented misperceptions about distributions of population characteristics (e.g., income
inequality) vary across societies.
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In many social and economic settings, from consumption choices to political activities, indi-
vidual incentives depend on behavior in society, for example due to network externalities or
adherence to social norms. An important channel through which people learn about behavior
in society is by interacting with and observing the behavior of their peers, such as neighbors,
coworkers, or online acquaintances. Many of these interactions are assortative, in the sense
that people interact more with others with similar characteristics—e.g., richer people are typi-
cally more likely than poorer people to have rich friends and conservatives are more likely than
liberals to know other conservatives; indeed, evidence suggests that societies may be growing
increasingly assortative.1 Assortativity creates scope for misperception, because the behavior
that individuals observe in their own interactions need not be representative of society as a
whole. But if people misperceive behavior in society, this affects their own incentives and
behavior, which in turn might influence others’ observations, perceptions, and behavior.
In this paper, we take an equilibrium-based approach to study the interplay between be-
havior and misperceptions in assortative societies. Our main focus is on a natural form of
misperception, assortativity neglect, where agents fail to take into account the extent of as-
sortativity in society, mistakenly believing that everyone interacts with a representative (or
more representative than actual) sample of the population.2 Our analysis allows us to address
how assortativity neglect affects agents’ behavior and their perceived distributions of popula-
tion characteristics (e.g., income or political attitudes); how this depends on the structure of
society; and why assortativity neglect might be an especially “persistent” misperception.
We consider a class of coordination games with assortative interactions. A society consists
of a large population of agents with linearly ordered types, along with an interaction structure
that randomly matches pairs of types. Capturing assortativity, higher types’ match distribu-
tions first-order stochastically dominate those of lower types. Agents’ coordination incentives
are modeled by best response functions that are linearly increasing in their own type, as well as
in expected behavior among their matches and in society as a whole. To investigate the inter-
play between behavior and (mis)perceptions, we consider an equilibrium notion in the spirit of
self-confirming equilibrium (Battigalli, 1987; Fudenberg and Levine, 1993), where agents best-
respond to perceptions of behavior and society that need only be consistent with the behavior
they observe among their matches. To capture which misperceptions might be especially per-
sistent, we also formalize a coherency criterion that requires agents to be able to “rationalize”
the behavior they observe based on their perceptions.
1E.g., Jargowsky (1996); Reardon and Bischoff (2011) document increased residential segregation by income
in the US, and Bishop (2009); Lawrence, Sides, and Farrell (2010); Huber and Malhotra (2017) find growing
offline and online segregation by political attitudes.
2Section 2.2 discusses empirical findings related to this misperception.
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Our main findings are threefold. First, relative to the correct perceptions benchmark, as-
sortativity neglect amplifies action dispersion, both by increasing the gap between higher and
lower types’ behavior in any fixed society and by acting as a “multiplier” that exacerbates the
effect of social changes (e.g., increased assortativity) on action dispersion. Second, assortativity
neglect is always a coherent misperception, regardless of the true level of assortativity in society;
by contrast, other misperceptions of the interaction structure are not always coherent. Finally,
assortativity neglect provides a lens through which to understand empirically documented mis-
perceptions about distributions of key population characteristics (e.g., income inequality) and
how they are shaped by the nature of agents’ social interactions.
To illustrate the setup and main findings, we present a simple example in the context of
education investment and residential sorting by income:
1.1 Illustrative Example
Consider a continuum population of agents, each of whom is endowed with one of three equally
likely types, representing socioeconomic status/income: “rich” (θh), “middle-class” (θm), or
“poor” (θl), with θh > θm = 0 > θl. For simplicity, focus on the symmetric case, θh = −θl.
Each agent knows her own type, but does not directly observe other agents’ types. Due to
neighborhood sorting by income, the richer an agent the more likely she is to interact with
other high income agents. Specifically, pairwise interaction probabilities are summarized by
























) measures the degree of assortativity.
Each agent θi chooses a level s(θi) ∈ R of monetary/time investment in education.3 Assume






















That is, agents of higher socioeconomic status have an intrinsic tendency to invest more in
education; but additionally, θi’s optimal education investment is increasing in local average
investment among the agents she interacts with (e.g., due to peer effects) and in global average
3We consider education investment to include decisions such as expenditures on educational materials or
tutors or the amount of effort exerted at school, but assume school choice (and other decisions that might
endogenously affect sorting) to be exogenous (e.g., because everyone enrolls in their neighborhood school).
3
investment in society as a whole (e.g., because future returns to education are boosted by
economy-wide knowledge spillovers).4 For simplicity, we assume an equal weight 1
3
on each





While Nash equilibrium assumes that agents best-respond to correct perceptions of behavior
in society, we formalize a notion of assortativity neglect equilibrium: Here agents are only able
to observe the local action distributions in their neighborhoods, and draw inferences from these
based on the misperception that there is no sorting, i.e., they perceive the sorting parameter
to be ρ̂ = 1
3








where θi best-responds to the correct local action average E[s(θ)|θi] but mistakenly believes






= −sAN(θl) and sAN(θm) = 0.
Increased action dispersion. Our first main finding is that assortativity neglect in-
creases action dispersion relative to Nash, through two channels. First, in any given society,





The intuition is simple and reflects a mutually reinforcing interplay between agents’ misper-
ceptions and behavior: Since the rich are more likely than the poor to interact with other rich
agents, they tend to observe higher education investment among their peers. Under assortativ-
ity neglect, this gives rise to a “false consensus effect” (Ross, Greene, and House, 1977), where
perceptions of average education investment in society, and hence of returns to education, are
increasing in agents’ socioeconomic status (and thus in their own investment). Relative to cor-
rect perceptions, this increases the education investment gap between the rich and poor, which
in turn, through observation of their peers’ behavior, feeds into the false consensus effect.
Second, assortativity neglect acts as a multiplier of social changes that increase action
4See, e.g., Bénabou (1993, 1996a,b); Fernández and Rogerson (1996, 2001); Durlauf (1996) for related (cor-
rectly specified) models of education investment with sorting and local and/or global complementarities.
5This is an extreme notion of assortativity neglect, where agents fully neglect sorting. Section 5.1.2 considers
weaker forms of assortativity neglect that allow for any perceived sorting parameter ρ̂ ∈ [ 13 , ρ].
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That is, the rich–poor education gap rises under Nash, but even more so under assortativity
neglect. Intuitively, greater sorting has a direct effect on the education gap under Nash, by
increasing differences in local peer effects between the rich and poor. However, under assor-
tativity neglect this additionally magnifies the false consensus effect, because the rich (poor)
mistakenly attribute their increased (decreased) local education investment levels to a global
trend in society, further polarizing their responses. An increase in income inequality d := θh−θl
has an analogous effect.
Coherency of assortativity neglect. So far, we have assumed that agents neglect sorting
but do not question whether the behavior they observe “makes sense” given this perception.
Suppose next that each agent seeks to rationalize what she sees, in the sense that, given
her perception of society, the behavior she observes must be consistent with everyone best-
responding to others’ behavior, a requirement we refer to as coherency. Our second main finding
is that assortativity neglect can always be coherently sustained, no matter how assortative the
actual society.
Agents’ rationalization procedure under assortativity neglect relates to the “fundamental
attribution error” studied in social psychology (Ross, 1977), i.e., a tendency to attribute others’
behavior to intrinsic characteristics rather than external factors such as social influence. For
instance, a middle-class agent θm observes three different investment levels ai := sAN(θi) (i =
h,m, l), but believes everyone to face the same peer effects, as she perceives local average




θm can rationalize observed differences in education investment by attributing them purely to
differences in income: If she perceives rich and poor types to be θ̂i = 3θi3−4(ρ− 1
3
)







ā; i.e., ai is a best response for θ̂i given θm’s perceptions.
While assortativity neglect is always coherent, we will show that any misperception of
interaction patterns other than assortativity neglect is not coherent in some environments. For
instance, in an asymmetric version of the present example where θh 6= −θl, we will derive an
upper bound ρ̄ ∈ [ρ, 2
3
) on the degree ρ̂ of sorting that θm can coherently perceive. Thus, θm can
arbitrarily underestimate assortativity, but there are limits to how much she can overestimate
assortativity.
Misperceptions of type distributions. Note that despite the fact that middle-class
agents interact with a representative sample of the population, θm misperceives the income
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distribution in society. This is because instead of being able to form perceptions of the income
distribution by directly observing peers’ income levels, θm draws inferences by rationalizing the
behavior she observes among her peers. In the present example, assortativity neglect leads θm
to overestimate income inequality, i.e., θ̂h > θh > θl > θ̂l, as she compensates for neglecting
socioeconomic differences in peer effects by attributing the rich–poor education gap entirely to
income. In general societies, a countervailing force is that an agent’s peers may be less heteroge-
neous than the overall population, so that assortativity neglect might lead her to underestimate
type dispersion. Section 4.2 shows that whether agents over- or underestimate type dispersion
depends on the relative strength of strategic complementarities and assortativity, and we relate
this to empirical findings on cross-country differences in perceptions of income inequality. We
also analyze agents’ misperceptions of their own position relative to the mean type and show
that this has implications for a society’s demand for redistribution.
1.2 Overview
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 defines assortativity neglect equilibrium in general
assortative societies. Moving beyond the simple illustrative example above, equilibrium behav-
ior does not typically admit a closed-form solution. Instead, Section 3 analyzes and contrasts
behavior under Nash and assortativity neglect by recasting assortative societies as monotone
Markov processes over their space of types. Moreover, by representing interaction patterns
in terms of the copula associated with a society, we identify an appropriate non-parametric
measure of assortativity under which more assortative societies are characterized precisely by
greater action dispersion, but more so under assortativity neglect than Nash. Section 4 ana-
lyzes the coherency of assortativity neglect and its implications for perceived type distributions
in general environments. Section 5 discusses several extensions and related literature, and
Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
2 Model
2.1 Society and Coordination Game
There is a continuum of agents with mass normalized to 1. Each agent is identified with a
type θ ∈ R. An agent’s type is her private information. Agents interact according to a random
matching technology. A society P specifies the probability with which any pair of types θ and
θ′ are matched:6
6As is also common in the network game literature, we view society P as exogenous and focus on analyzing
equilibrium behavior (and perceptions). See Pin and Rogers (2016) for a survey of potential sources of assor-
tativity, such as institutional constraints determining meeting opportunities or socio-psychological factors (e.g.,
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Definition 1. A society is a joint cdf P over R× R that is:
1. symmetric: P (θ, θ′) = P (θ′, θ) for all θ, θ′
2. assortative: P (·|θ) first-order stochastically dominates P (·|θ′) if θ ≥ θ′.7
Symmetry is a consistency condition required to describe a random matching in a popu-
lation. Assortativity captures the idea that higher types are more likely than lower types to
interact with other high types. Note that a society P jointly summarizes an underlying type
distribution , described by the marginal distribution F := margP , and a matching technol-
ogy , which for every type θ specifies the distribution P (·|θ) of θ’s matches. We assume that
the distribution F is absolutely continuous, L1 and has a connected support, denoted by Θ.
Let F denote the set of all cdfs with these properties.
Society is engaged in an incomplete-information coordination game. Agents have symmetric
action sets A = R, and a strategy profile is a Borel-measurable function s : Θ→ A that specifies
an action s(θ) for each type θ. To model coordination motives, we focus on linear best response
functions, which are widely used in the literature on network games and incomplete-information
coordination games;8 Section 5.1.3 discusses more general best response functions. Specifically,
there exist coefficients γ, β ≥ 0 with γ + β < 1 such that each type θ’s best response against
any strategy profile s in society P is given by
BRθ(s, P ) = (1− γ − β)θ + γEP [s(θ′)|θ] + βEF [s(θ′)]. (1)
The first term captures that higher types have an intrinsic tendency to take higher actions.
The second term represents a local coordination motive, whereby each type θ’s best response is
increasing in her matches’ expected behavior. Finally, reflecting a global coordination motive,
θ’s best response is also increasing in the average action in society as a whole.
While our analysis takes best response function (1) as its primitive, a utility function that
gives rise to (1) is
UP (θ, a, s) = −
ˆ ˆ (
a− (1− γ − β)θ − γs(θ′)− βs(θ′′)
)2
dP (θ′|θ)dF (θ′′). (2)
That is, θ faces a quadratic miscoordination cost that reflects the gap between her action and
a weighted sum of her type and realized actions among her matches and in society.
homophily).
7P (·|θ) denotes the conditional distribution given that one of the two types in the match is realized to be θ.
By the symmetry assumption, it is irrelevant which of the two types’ realizations we condition on.
8See, e.g., Jackson and Zenou (2013) for a survey of the former and Morris and Shin (2002); Angeletos and
Pavan (2007); Bergemann and Morris (2013) for the latter.
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In addition to education investment (Section 1.1), other economic examples include many
consumption decisions that depend on income either positively (e.g., luxury good consump-
tion) or negatively (e.g., smoking), but may also exhibit both direct peer-to-peer consumption
complementarities and material or socio-psychological global payoff complementarities (e.g.,
economy-wide technological complementarities or a desire to adhere to a social norm). Like-
wise, types might represent political attitudes on a left-right spectrum and actions the extent
to which agents manifest support for particular positions (e.g., by posting political content on
social media), where related local and global coordination/conformity motives may be at play.
2.2 Copula Representation and Assortativity Neglect
As noted, any society P jointly summarizes an underlying type distribution F = margΘ P
and a matching technology (P (·|θ))θ∈Θ. In general, varying the matching technology of P also
changes the type distribution, and vice versa. To be able to disentangle these two dimensions,
we also make use of the following equivalent representation of societies, which expresses who
interacts with whom not in terms of types θ ∈ Θ (e.g., a particular wealth level), but in terms
of type quantiles x ∈ [0, 1] (e.g., the 5th wealth percentile).
Formally, for any society P with type distribution F ∈ F , define C(x, x′) to be the proba-
bility that two agents whose type quantiles are below x and x′ are matched; that is,
C(x, x′) := P (F−1(x), F−1(x′)) for all x, x′ ∈ (0, 1), (3)
and C(x, 0) = C(0, x) := 0, C(x, 1) = C(1, x) := x for all x ∈ [0, 1].9 Note that C is a (two-
dimensional) copula, i.e., a joint cdf over [0, 1]2 with uniform marginals. Moreover, copula C
inherits symmetry and assortativity from P .10 We refer to symmetric and assortative copulas
as interaction structures .
Any society induces an interaction structure via (3). Conversely, given any interaction
structure C and type distribution F ∈ F , defining P (θ, θ′) := C(F (θ), F (θ′)) for all θ, θ′ yields
a society. Thus, pairs (F,C) of type distributions F ∈ F and interaction structures C yield
an equivalent representation of societies. From now on, we focus on societies whose interaction
structure C admits a density function c(·, ·) that is positive and absolutely continuous on (0, 1)2;
let C denote the class of all interaction structures with these properties.11
Example 1 (Gaussian societies). As a simple parametric example, let P be given by a sym-
9For any cdf G, its inverse is defined by G−1(x) := inf{v ∈ R : G(v) ≥ x} for each x ∈ (0, 1).
10That is, C(x, x′) = C(x′, x) for all x, x′; and C(·|x) first-order stochastically dominates C(·|x′) if x ≥ x′.
11Assuming a positive and absolutely continuous density is not essential for most results, but it simplifies the
exposition.
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metric bivariate Gaussian distribution, where











and the correlation coefficient ρ := σ1,2
σ2
∈ [0, 1) is nonnegative to ensure assortativity. The
corresponding type distribution F is normally distributed and fully parametrized by its mean
µ and variance σ2. Interaction structure C is fully parametrized by the correlation coefficient
ρ: C(x, x′) := Φρ(Φ−1(x),Φ−1(x′)), where Φ is the standard normal cdf and Φρ is the cdf of the











The next subsection will introduce the idea that instead of knowing the actual society
P = (F,C), each type θ has in mind a perceived society P̂θ that may differ from P . We
will be especially interested in a natural form of misperception, where agents fail to take into
account the fact that society is assortative. By decomposing θ’s perceived society P̂θ into a
perceived type distribution F̂θ and perceived interaction structure Ĉθ,12 we can formalize this
misperception as follows. Let the independent interaction structure CI ∈ C be given by
CI(x, x
′) = xx′ for all x, x′; that is, regardless of an agent’s own quantile x, the distribution
CI(·|x) of her matches’ quantiles is uniform on [0, 1].
We say that θ suffers from assortativity neglect if Ĉθ = CI . Thus, under assortativity
neglect, θ fails to take into account that agents’ match distributions depend on their position
in the type distribution and instead perceives everyone to interact with a representative sample
of society as a whole. Note that Ĉθ = CI is equivalent to the requirement that P̂θ(·|θ′) = F̂θ
for all θ′; that is, assortativity neglect imposes no restrictions on θ’s perception F̂θ of the type
distribution in society, as long as she perceives all agents’ match distributions to coincide with
F̂θ. However, Section 4 will show that assortativity neglect uniquely pins down F̂θ in (coherent)
equilibrium.
Assortativity neglect can be seen as a form of “projection bias,” whereby θ projects her
own (perceived) match distribution onto all other agents’ match distributions (i.e., P̂θ(·|θ) =
P̂θ(·|θ′)); this is broadly in line with findings in the empirical literature on “network cogni-
tion.”13 Assortativity neglect also relates to empirically documented information-processing
biases, notably “selection neglect” (Enke, 2017; Esponda and Vespa, 2014, 2018; Barron, Huck,
and Jehiel, 2019), where agents fail to take into account that the information they see may be







for all x, x′ ∈ (0, 1).
13E.g., Dessi, Gallo, and Goyal (2016) elicit subjects’ assessments of degree distributions on a network and
document a projection bias, where subjects project their own number of neighbors (i.e., their degree) onto other
agents in the network. More broadly, a literature in social psychology documents related “location effects” in
individuals’ perceptions of their interaction structures (for a survey, see Brands, 2013).
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subject to selection effects. Section 5.2 discusses the relationship with theoretical work that
incorporates these and related biases.
Finally, we note that the above notion of assortativity neglect is quite extreme, as θ perceives
everyone to interact with a perfectly representative sample of society. Section 5.1.2 will discuss
weaker forms of assortativity neglect.
2.3 Assortativity Neglect Equilibrium
To study the equilibrium implications of assortativity neglect, we move beyond the standard
equilibrium notion of (Bayes) Nash which assumes that agents best-respond to correct percep-
tions about the underlying strategy profile s and society P .
Instead, we employ an equilibrium notion in the spirit of self-confirming equilibrium (Bat-
tigalli, 1987; Fudenberg and Levine, 1993) that formalizes the following idea. We think of our
coordination game as the steady state of a setting where successive generations of agents choose
actions based only on observing the behavior in their local neighborhoods. That is, before a
new generation of types take actions, each new type θ first observes the current action distri-
bution among types from her match distribution P (·|θ) (e.g., the current education investment
distribution in her neighborhood). In the steady state of such a setting, we might expect agents
to possess a good understanding of the action distributions among their matches. However, as
this is only a very partial snapshot of society, this information need not be enough for them to
correctly identify s and P .
Capturing this, in any given society P , our equilibrium notion summarizes which true be-
havior s and (mis)perceptions of s and P can jointly arise, subject to two requirements: (1)
Each agent best-responds to her perceptions of s and P ; (2) these perceptions need not be
correct, but are consistent with the true action distribution among her matches.
Formally, we first define each type θ’s local action distribution, i.e., the distribution of
actions among θ’s matches. When the true strategy profile and society are s and P , this is
given by the distribution Hs,Pθ over actions that arises when θ’s matches are drawn from P (·|θ)





′|θ) for all a ∈ A. (4)
Definition 2. Given any (P, γ, β), an equilibrium is an L1 strategy profile s15 together with
a perceived society P̂θ and perceived strategy profile ŝθ for each type θ satisfying:
1. Best response: s(θ) = BRθ(ŝθ, P̂θ).





2. Observational consistency : Hs,Pθ = H
ŝθ,P̂θ
θ .
An assortativity neglect equilibrium (ANE) is an equilibrium (s, (ŝθ, P̂θ)θ) such that Ĉθ =
CI for all θ.
Underlying any equilibrium is a true society P and strategy profile s. While Nash equilib-
rium assumes that players best-respond to correct perceptions about both, Definition 2 allows
more generally that each type θ best-responds to some possibly incorrect perceived society P̂θ
and strategy profile ŝθ. However, by observational consistency, these perceptions are disciplined
by the requirement that θ’s perceived local action distribution H ŝθ,P̂θθ coincide with the true
local action distribution Hs,Pθ .
Our main focus is on the case of assortativity neglect equilibrium, where all types θ suffer
from assortativity neglect. In Section 3, we will show that ANE always exists and behavior
under ANE is uniquely pinned down, so that Definition 2 is suitable for understanding and
contrasting the behavioral implications of assortativity neglect and Nash.
At the same time, Definition 2 is quite weak in that it captures a “mechanical” view of other
agents’ behavior: As long as θ’s perceptions predict the correct local action distribution, she
can hold arbitrary perceptions ŝθ of behavior in society, without asking whether this behavior ŝθ
“makes sense” under her perceived society P̂θ. This renders Definition 2 very permissive: Indeed,
we will see that essentially any perceived strategy profiles (including ŝθ that are decreasing in
types) and any perceived type distributions can arise under ANE; more generally, any perceived
society P̂θ can be sustained as part of some equilibrium (Appendix E.1).
Given this, we introduce a refinement that imposes the following coherency requirement on
each agent’s perceptions of behavior and society: We require that the behavior ŝθ(θ′) that θ
attributes to any other type θ′ should be a best response given ŝθ and P̂θ.
Definition 3. An equilibrium (s, (ŝθ, P̂θ)θ) is coherent if each type θ’s perceptions satisfy
ŝθ(θ
′) = BRθ′(ŝθ, P̂θ) for each θ′.
Coherent equilibria capture misperceptions that might be thought of as especially “persis-
tent:” Indeed, each agent’s perceptions ŝθ and P̂θ not only correctly predict her observations (by
observational consistency), but additionally can rationalize these observations (by coherency).
Thus, based on introspection alone and absent additional external information, there is a sense
in which agents might never realize that they hold misperceptions. Section 4 will show that
assortativity neglect is persistent in this sense, as in any society there exists a coherent ANE;
moreover, the coherent ANE is unique, yielding sharp predictions for agents’ perceived type
distributions under assortativity neglect. We will also see that other misperceptions of society
need not be coherent.
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Remark 1. We briefly comment on some features of our equilibrium notion:
Connection with SCE. In general games, self-confirming equilibrium (SCE) captures play-
ers who best-respond to beliefs about others’ strategies that need not be correct, but need only
be consistent with some limited feedback about opponents’ behavior.16 Definition 2 applies this
idea to a setting where agents’ feedback is limited to observing the action distribution among
their matches, which are determined by an underlying assortative society P . In addition to be-
liefs about strategies, we also treat beliefs about P as endogenous equilibrium objects. Moving
beyond SCE, Definition 3 imposes a rationalization requirement that relates to rationalizable
conjectural equilibrium (see the third paragraph below).
No feedback from payoffs. As in other important special cases of SCE (e.g., Eyster
and Rabin, 2005; Jehiel, 2005; Jehiel and Koessler, 2008), we implicitly assume that agents
do not receive additional feedback from their payoffs. In the above interpretation in terms of
successive generations of short-lived agents, this captures that each new agent can base her
action choice only on current behavior but not payoffs in her neighborhood, as fits settings
(e.g., education investment) where payoffs are realized only in the more distant future.17 An
alternative interpretation is that global payoffs (e.g., to smoking) represent “psychological”
utilities without direct material feedback (e.g., a desire to conform to a perceived social norm).
Finally, note that even if agents observe their payoffs, this information need not be enough to
identify s and P ;18 thus, non-Nash behavior can continue to arise.
Nash rationalization. Coherency requires each agent θ to be able to use her own per-
ceptions ŝθ, P̂θ to rationalize the behavior ŝθ(θ′) she attributes to any other agent θ′. We refer
to this requirement as Nash rationalization, as it implies that θ’s perceived strategy profile ŝθ
is a Nash equilibrium given her perceived society P̂θ. Section 5.1.4 discusses a more permissive
coherency notion in the spirit of rationalizable conjectural equilibrium (Rubinstein and Wolin-
sky, 1994; Esponda, 2013), where θ (despite being confident in her own perceptions ŝθ and P̂θ)
entertains the possibility that θ′ best-responds to different perceptions.
Homogeneous misperceptions. Under ANE, all agents perceive the same interaction
structure CI . Section 5.1.1 presents an extension to a hybrid model where only some fraction
of agents of each type suffer from assortativity neglect and the remaining fraction have correct
perceptions. Additionally, our weaker notions of assortativity neglect (Section 5.1.2) allow
perceived interaction structures Ĉθ to vary across types θ. N
16Section 5.2 discusses the SCE literature in more detail.
17Concretely, global payoffs might represent an adolescent’s future employment prospects (which depend
on current education investment in society as a whole, due to the global complementarities highlighted in
Section 1.1), but at the time of investing in her education she might only have access to information about current
education investment (and not the long-run employment outcomes) among adolescents in her neighborhood.
18E.g., under quadratic-loss utilities (2), realized payoffs UP (θ, a, s) do not uniquely identify local and global
average behavior.
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3 Behavior under Assortativity Neglect
3.1 Increased Action Dispersion under Assortativity Neglect
We now proceed to analyze and contrast behavior under Nash and assortativity neglect. A
first key observation is the following: Even though our model is static, any society P induces
a discrete-time Markov process over its space of types Θ, with initial distribution given by the
type distribution F = margΘ P and transition kernel represented by the matching technology
(P (·|θ))θ∈Θ. That is, this process first draws an initial type θ0 ∈ Θ according to F , then draws
type θ0’s match θ1 according to P (·|θ0), type θ1’s match θ2 according to P (·|θ1), and so on.
We refer to this Markov process as the process of t-step ahead matches in society and also
denote it by P . Note that F is a stationary distribution of the process. Moreover, assortativity
of P corresponds precisely to this process being monotone (Daley, 1968); this feature plays an
important role throughout our analysis.19
The process of t-step ahead matches yields a simple description of the Nash strategy profile
sNE of our game. Indeed, iterating the best response condition (1), we have
sNE(θ) = (1− γ − β)θ + γEP [s(θ1) | θ0 = θ] + βEF [s(θ′)] = . . .
= (1− γ − β)
τ∑
t=0
γt (EP [θt | θ0 = θ] + βEF [s(θ′)]) + γτ+1EP [s(θτ+1) | θ0 = θ]
for all θ and τ ∈ N. In Appendix B.1, we verify that the higher-order term γτ+1EP [s(θτ+1)|θ0 =
θ] vanishes as τ →∞, yielding the following result:
Lemma 1 (Nash equilibrium). For any (P, γ, β), there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. Nash
strategies are strictly increasing in types with average action EF [sNE(θ)] = EF [θ] and
sNE(θ) = (1− γ − β)
∞∑
t=0
γtEP [θt|θ0 = θ] +
βEF [θ′]
1− γ
for all θ. (5)
Thus, θ’s Nash action is a weighted average of a γ-discounted sum of her expected t-step
ahead matches and a constant that depends only on γ, β, and the type mean EF [θ′] in society.
Her behavior is increasing in her type for two reasons: First, because of the direct effect that
higher types prefer higher actions. Second, because higher types are more likely to meet other
high types; this is reflected by the fact that, due to the monotonicity of the Markov process P ,
all t-step ahead expectations EP [θt|θ0 = θ] are (weakly) increasing in θ.
By contrast, consider any assortativity neglect equilibrium (s, (P̂θ, ŝθ)θ). For each θ, the best-
19Higher-order expectations of others’ types (Samet, 1998) without monotonicity play an important role in
other papers on coordination games (e.g., Morris and Shin, 2002; Golub and Morris, 2017).
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response requirement means that s(θ) = (1− γ− β)θ+ γEP̂θ [ŝθ(θ
′)|θ] + βEF̂θ [ŝθ(θ
′)]. Moreover,
since θ suffers from assortativity neglect (i.e., Ĉθ = CI), she perceives her local action mean
and global action mean to coincide, i.e., EP̂θ [ŝθ(θ
′)|θ] = EF̂θ [ŝθ(θ
′)]. Finally, observational
consistency implies that θ is correct about her local action action mean, i.e., EP̂θ [ŝθ(θ
′)|θ] =
EP [s(θ
′)|θ]. Combining these observations yields the misspecified best response
s(θ) = (1− γ − β)θ + (γ + β)EP [s(θ′)|θ] =: BRANθ (s, P ). (6)
As under Nash, iterating (6) implies that in any ANE, behavior is uniquely given by
sAN(θ) = (1− γ − β)
∞∑
t=0
(γ + β)tEP [θt|θ0 = θ] for all θ, (7)
i.e., θ’s action is a (γ + β)-discounted sum of her expected t-step ahead matches under P .20
Generalizing the illustrative example in Section 1.1, a first key implication is that assorta-
tivity neglect increases action dispersion relative to Nash. Formally, comparing (5) and (7), the
fact that t-step ahead expectations EP [θt|θ0 = θ] are increasing in θ implies
sAN(θ)− sAN(θ′) ≥ sNE(θ)− sNE(θ′) for all θ > θ′,
with strict inequality if β > 0 and C 6= CI . Equivalently, in terms of the induced cdfs over
actions, the ANE action distribution HAN = F ◦ sAN−1 is more dispersive than the Nash
action distribution HNE = F ◦sNE−1; that is, HAN−1(x)−HAN−1(y) ≥ HNE−1(x)−HNE−1(y)
for all 0 < y ≤ x < 1. Since the average actions under (5) and (7) coincide, this implies that
HAN is a mean-preserving spread of HNE.21
Proposition 1 (Assortativity neglect equilibrium). For any (P, β, γ), there exists an assorta-
tivity neglect equilibrium. In any assortativity neglect equilibrium, behavior sAN is given by (7).
The action distribution HAN is more dispersive than the Nash action distribution HNE.
While Proposition 1 uniquely pins down behavior sAN , ANE are far from unique: As the
proof shows (Appendix B.2), ANE allows for essentially arbitrary perceived type distributions
F̂θ and strategy profiles ŝθ. However, Section 4 will show that there is a unique coherent ANE.
Proposition 1 reflects a “false consensus effect:” Under any monotonic strategy profile,
assortativity neglect leads higher types to perceive first-order stochastically higher global action
20Both (5) and (7) can be interpreted as steady states of the following adjustment/learning process: Starting
with any monotone strategy profile s0, if agents repeatedly best-respond to previous period behavior according
to (1) and (6), play converges to (5) and (7), respectively.




φ(a) dH2(a) for any convex
function φ : R→ R for which the integrals are well-defined. For cdfs that share the same mean, the dispersive
order is stronger than the mean-preserving spread order (e.g., Shaked and Shanthikumar, 2007).
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distributions. Relative to correct perceptions, this drives up the gap between higher and lower
types’ best responses and in turn, through observation of matches’ behavior, reinforces the gap
in their perceptions of global behavior. Under coherent ANE, we will see that the same effect
applies to agents’ perceived type distributions. These predictions are in line with the eponymous
finding in social psychology (Ross, Greene, and House, 1977; Marks and Miller, 1987) that
people’s perceptions of others’ attributes and behaviors tend to be positively correlated with
their own attributes and behaviors. This has been documented in a wide variety of settings,
from perceptions of income levels or political attitudes to the perceived prevalence of smoking
in society.22
3.2 Multiplier Effect of Assortativity Neglect
Proposition 1 shows that assortativity neglect increases action dispersion relative to Nash in
any fixed society. We now highlight a second channel through which assortativity neglect can
lead to more dispersed behavior: By amplifying the effect of two key social changes—increased
assortativity and increased type heterogeneity. Remark 2 briefly points to some implications of
these findings in specific economic examples.
While the illustrative example in Section 1.1 suggests an intuitive connection between
increased assortativity and action dispersion, formalizing this requires an appropriate non-
parametric notion of when one society is more assortative than another. We capture this by
means of the following partial order over interaction structures: Call C1 more assortative
than C2 (denoted C1 %MA C2) if C1(x∗, y∗) ≥ C2(x∗, y∗) for any x∗, y∗ ∈ (0, 1). That is, as illus-
trated in Figure 1, C1 assigns higher probability than C2 to low–low matches (between agents
below quantiles x∗ and y∗), or equivalently, assigns higher probability to high–high matches
(above quantiles x∗ and y∗).23 Note that the independent interaction structure CI is the least
assortative interaction structure, while the most assortative one is the perfectly assortative
interaction structure where each quantile is matched only with types of the same quantile.24
Moreover, for Gaussian societies (Example 1) it can be shown that Cρ1 %MA Cρ2 if and only if
ρ1 ≥ ρ2; that is, assortativity is parametrized precisely by the correlation coefficient.
To consider the effect of increased assortativity, we compare Nash and ANE action distri-
butions and strategies HNEi , sNEi , HANi , sANi across environments (F,Ci, γ, β) that differ only
22E.g., Dawtry, Sutton, and Sibley (2015) find that individuals’ perceptions of mean income are increasing
in own income and Bauman and Geher (2002) that perceived support for particular policies (e.g., abortion) is
higher among supporters than opponents. Botvin, Botvin, Baker, Dusenbury, and Goldberg (1992) document
that perceived smoking prevalence is higher for smokers than non-smokers and positively related to the number
of friends who smoke (in line with misinference from local observations).
23In the statistics literature (e.g., Joe, 1997), this ordering is referred to as PQD (positive quadrant depen-
dence) or concordance order and is used more generally to compare any two-dimensional cdfs. For other uses
in economics, see e.g., Meyer and Strulovici (2012).









Figure 1: C1 %MA C2 if and only if C1 assigns higher probability than C2 to the high–high region and
low–low region and lower probability to the low–high and high–low region.
in their interaction structures Ci:25
Proposition 2 (Effect of Assortativity). For any C1, C2 ∈ C, the following are equivalent:
1. C1 is more assortative than C2.
2. HNE1 is a mean-preserving spread of HNE2 for all (F, γ, β).
3. HAN1 is a mean-preserving spread of HAN2 for all (F, γ, β).
4. For all θ∗ ∈ Θ and (F, γ, β),
EF [sAN1 (θ)− sAN2 (θ) | θ ≥ θ∗] ≥ EF [sNE1 (θ)− sNE2 (θ) | θ ≥ θ∗] ≥ 0.
The equivalence of parts 1–3 shows that %MA is an appropriate measure of assortativity
to formalize the tight connection between increased assortativity and action dispersion: Not
only does more assortativity lead to greater action dispersion (by “1 ⇒ 2, 3”), but greater
action dispersion is indeed a defining feature of more assortative societies (by “2, 3 ⇒ 1”).
However, while this is true under both Nash and ANE, part 4 highlights that any given rise
in assortativity has a stronger effect on action dispersion under assortativity neglect: High
types’ actions increase more on average (and equivalently, low types’ actions decrease more)
than under Nash.26
25An analog of Proposition 2 can be provided by replacing mean-preserving spread with the dispersive order
and %MA with a stronger more-assortative order (see Appendix D.2.2). Likewise, an analog of Proposition 3
holds by replacing dispersive order with mean-preserving spread.
26Note that for i ∈ {NE,AN}, Hi1 is a mean-preserving spread of Hi2 iff EF [si1(θ)− si2(θ) | θ ≥ θ∗] ≥ 0 for all
θ∗. Thus, part 4 captures that the mean-preserving spread increase from Hi2 to Hi1 is greater under ANE than
Nash.
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Section 1.1 discussed the basic intuition for the forward direction: A rise in assortativity
increases differences in local coordination incentives across types (under Nash and ANE), but
under ANE it additionally increases differences in perceived global coordination incentives by
magnifying the false consensus effect. To establish the formal equivalence result, Appendix B.3
exploits the Markov process representation of Nash and ANE in (5) and (7), reducing the
problem to a comparison of t-step ahead expectations across different societies.
Specifically, for any society P = (F,C) and t ≥ 1, let DtP denote the distribution of EP [θt|θ0]
where θ0 is distributed according to F ; that is, DtP is the distribution of expected t-step ahead
matches in society. Monotonicity of the Markov process P allows us to establish a “duality”
between the more assortative order over interaction structures and the mean-preserving spread
order over expected t-step ahead match distributions DtF,Ci ; that is, C1 is more assortative
than C2 if and only if DtF,C1 is a mean-preserving spread of D
t
F,C2
for all F and t.27 We then
complete the proof by combining the representations of Nash and ANE as discounted sums of
expected t-step ahead matches with the fact that the mean-preserving spread order is linear
and continuous.
Finally, comparing environments (Fi, C, γ, β) that differ only in their type distributions, we
obtain an analogous result: Increased type dispersion corresponds to increased action dispersion
under both Nash and ANE, but the effect is stronger under ANE.
Proposition 3 (Effect of Type Dispersion). For any F1, F2 ∈ F , the following are equivalent:
1. F1 is more dispersive than F2.
2. HNE1 is more dispersive than HNE2 for any (C, γ, β).
3. HAN1 is more dispersive than HAN2 for any (C, γ, β).
4. For all (C, γ, β) and x, y ∈ (0, 1) with x > y,
∆x,yH
AN
1 −∆x,yHAN2 ≥ ∆x,yHNE1 −∆x,yHNE2 ≥ 0,
where ∆x,yH := H−1(x)−H−1(y) for any cdf H.
Remark 2. We briefly discuss some economic implications of the multiplier effect:
Education inequality. A growing literature studies the possibility of decreasing the socioe-
conomic education gap by reducing income-based residential segregation, e.g., through programs
such as “Moving to Opportunity.”28 In line with the Nash prediction of Proposition 2, much
27This result follows from Lemma B.1, which shows that C1 %MA C2 if and only if D1F,C1 is a mean-preserving
spread of D1F,C2 for all F , combined with Lemma A.3, which establishes that the mean-preserving spread order
is “isotone.”
28E.g., Chetty, Hendren, and Katz (2016). Surveys of the literature on neighborhood/peer effects in education
include Durlauf (2004); Sacerdote (2011).
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theoretical and empirical work emphasizes the role of direct local complementarities, either
socio-psychological (e.g., peer effects) or material (e.g., local provision of educational facilities).
Under ANE, we additionally highlight an inferential channel: Decreasing the segregation of
disadvantaged individuals might reduce their misinferences from local observations about the
returns to education (which are subject to global complementarities).29 Moreover, this infer-
ential channel suggests that further reduction in the education gap might be achieved through
informational interventions that correct misperceptions.
Smoking. Many developed countries have seen rising socioeconomic disparities in cigarette
consumption.30 One explanation is that growing information about the risks of smoking may
have been absorbed more readily by individuals of higher socioeconomic status, but there is a
discussion in the empirical literature about whether socioeconomic variations in knowledge of
smoking risks are indeed significant enough to account for large behavior differences.31 Proposi-
tion 3 suggests that the behavioral impact of even a moderate rise in the socioeconomic knowl-
edge gap might be exacerbated under assortativity neglect:32 The direct effect on behavior
could be amplified by the indirect effect of an increased gap in the perceived societal prevalence
of smoking. See the discussion following Proposition 1 for evidence of a false consensus effect
in the context of smoking. N
Example 2 (Example 1 continued). In a Gaussian society P parametrized by (µ, σ2, ρ), each
type θ0’s distribution P (·|θ0) of matches is also normal with mean EP [θ1|θ0] = (1− ρ)µ + ρθ0;
inductively, EP [θt|θ0] = (1− ρt)µ+ ρtθ0 for all t. Applying (5) and (7) yields strategy profiles
sNE(θ) =
1− β − γ
1− γρ
θ +
β + γ(1− ρ)
1− γρ
µ, sAN(θ) =
1− β − γ
1− (β + γ)ρ
θ +
(β + γ)(1− ρ)
1− (β + γ)ρ
µ,










σ2, respectively. In line with
Proposition 1, ANE features a higher action variance than Nash. Moreover, both variances
are increasing in ρ and σ2, but the derivative is higher under ANE than Nash, reflecting the
multiplier effect in Propositions 2–3. N
29Streufert (2000) proposes a non-equilibrium model where poor individuals assess the returns to schooling
by exogenously sampling outcomes in their neighborhood, neglecting the fact that successful individuals do not
appear in their observations as they have left the neighborhood.
30E.g., US smoking rates from the mid-1960s to 2000 declined by 62% among the top income quintile but by
only 9% among the lowest income quintile (Wan, 2017).
31See, e.g., Siahpush, McNeill, Hammond, and Fong (2006) for evidence of significant knowledge differences
and Pampel, Krueger, and Denney (2010); Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2010) (p. 357 & p. 9) for a counterpoint.
32To apply Proposition 3, we interpret types as capturing ignorance about smoking risks, which are decreasing
in income, and we assume that sorting is based on income. An increase in the socioeconomic knowledge gap
can then be captured by increased dispersion of F , while holding fixed interaction structure C.
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4 Coherency of Assortativity Neglect
4.1 Rationalizing Assortativity Neglect
We now show that in any environment, there is a coherent ANE. Thus, even when agents
seek to rationalize observed behavior, assortativity neglect is a misperception that can persist
regardless of how assortative the actual society is. Moreover, whereas Proposition 1 only pinned
down ANE behavior, we show that the coherent ANE is unique. In particular, for any (P, γ, β),
it fully determines agents’ misperceptions F̂θ about the type distribution, paving the way for
comparative statics analysis of how these are shaped by the nature of social interactions.
Proposition 4 (Coherency of Assortativity Neglect). For any (P, γ, β), there exists a unique
coherent assortativity neglect equilibrium.
The existence of coherent ANE is due to the following defining feature of assortativity
neglect: If an agent’s perceived interaction structure is CI , she can rationalize any behavior.
Formally, Lemma B.2 in the appendix shows that for any action distribution Ĥ and any γ, β,
there is an appropriate type distribution F̂ such that Ĥ is the Nash action distribution in
society (F̂ , CI); moreover, CI is the only interaction structure with this feature.
To see the idea, note that in order for Ĥ to be the Nash action distribution in society (F̂ , Ĉ),
it must be possible to decompose the action difference between any two quantiles x > y into
two terms—the corresponding type difference and the difference in local coordination incentives,
where the latter results from differences in x and y’s matches’ behavior and is greater under
more assortative Ĉ (as highlighted by Proposition 2):
Ĥ−1(x)− Ĥ−1(y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆(actions)











The key feature of the independent interaction structure Ĉ = CI is that there is no difference
between x and y’s coordination incentives, as all agents face the same distribution of matches.
This makes it possible to rationalize Ĥ by simply attributing all action dispersion to type
dispersion. Moreover, for any Ĥ there is a unique type distribution F̂ that achieves this while
also yielding the correct action mean EĤ [a] = EF̂ [θ]. To prove Proposition 4, Appendix B.4
applies this idea to each type’s local action distribution Hs
AN ,P
θ under ANE, which uniquely
determines θ’s perceived type distribution F̂θ and strategy profile ŝθ.
As discussed in the illustrative example, this rationalization procedure is reminiscent of the
“fundamental attribution error” (Ross, 1977), as it attributes variation in others’ behavior en-
tirely to intrinsic characteristics (types) and neglects that external factors (differences in peer
effects) might also be at play. While this procedure is always succesful under assortativity
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neglect, Section 4.3 will show that it does not apply under other perceived interaction struc-
tures, as ignoring differences in local coordination incentives is not feasible when Ĉ 6= CI . We
will use this to establish a converse of Proposition 4 and to derive limits on agents’ coherent
misperceptions in any given environment.
4.2 Perceived Type Distributions
Since coherent ANE uniquely pins down F̂θ, it provides a lens through which to study how
agents’ misperceptions of population characteristics are shaped by the nature of their social
interactions. As we discuss below, this may be helpful in understanding empirical findings on
misperceptions of income distributions and has implications for models of demand for redistri-
bution.
Throughout this section, given any environment (P, γ, β), let F̂θ denote θ’s perceived type
distribution in the coherent ANE at (P, γ, β). We begin by noting that under coherent ANE,
the “false consensus effect” we observed for perceived behavior following Proposition 1 extends
to F̂θ: The only way for higher types to rationalize their higher perceived action distributions
is by perceiving higher type distributions.
Corollary 1 (False Consensus Effect). For any (P, γ, β), F̂θ is increasing in θ with respect to
first-order stochastic dominance.
The false consensus effect would also emerge if agents were able to directly observe their
local match distributions P (·|θ) and formed perceptions of the global type distribution by
projecting P (·|θ) onto society as a whole.33 Indeed, this setting corresponds to coherent ANE
when coordination motives γ+β are zero, as in this case sAN(θ) = θ for all types. However, we
now exhibit two ways in which the fact that under coherent ANE, agents form perceptions by
rationalizing observed local behavior leads to more nuanced predictions, where the strength of
coordination motives γ + β relative to other societal features such as assortativity plays a key
role.
First, we show that coordination motives drive up agents’ perceptions of type dispersion
(e.g., income inequality) in society. Moreover, coordination motives matter not only quantita-
tively, but affect the direction of agents’ misperceptions: Depending on the strength of γ + β,
agents may over- or underestimate global type dispersion. Notably, overestimation is possible
even when agents’ local match distributions are less dispersed than the global type distribution,
which is a natural feature that holds on average in any society.34
33In the context of income distributions, the idea that agents directly observe peers’ types and project them
onto society underlies Cruces, Perez-Truglia, and Tetaz (2013) and Windsteiger (2018), who emphasize that
this may lead to underestimation of income inequality.






Figure 2: Over-/underestimation of type vari-
ance in Example 3.
µ̂L at ρ = 0.95
µ̂L at ρ = 0.75
µ̂H at ρ = 0.75
µ̂H at ρ = 0.95
γ + β
Figure 3: Dispersion of perceived type means in
Example 4.
Proposition 5 (Perceived type dispersion). Fix any P and β1 + γ1 ≤ β2 + γ2. Let F̂ iθ denote
type θ’s perceived type distribution under the coherent ANE at (P, βi, γi). Then F̂ 2θ is more
dispersive than F̂ 1θ for all θ.
Example 3 (Over-/underestimation of type dispersion). Consider a Gaussian society P =




Hence, θ’s local action distribution is normally distributed with mean µ + (θ − µ)ρ 1−β−γ
1−(β+γ)ρ
and variance σ2 (1−γ−β)
2(1−ρ2)
(1−(β+γ)ρ)2 . Thus, coherency implies that F̂θ is normal with mean µ̂θ =
µ + (θ − µ)ρ 1−β−γ




(1−(β+γ)ρ)2 . Note that θ’s match distribution has
variance σ2(1 − ρ2), which is less than the global type variance σ2. If γ + β = 0, then θ’s
perceived type distribution is equal to her match distribution, so that σ̂2θ < σ2. However,
σ̂2θ is increasing in γ + β, and σ̂2θ > σ2 whenever
2(γ+β)
1+(γ+β)2
> ρ. Thus, θ overestimates (resp.
underestimates) type dispersion when γ + β is large (resp. small) relative to the assortativity
parameter ρ. Figure 2 illustrates. N
To understand Proposition 5, it is important to note that stronger coordination motives in
fact lead to less dispersed ANE behavior (Appendix C.5): This is because as γ + β increases,
θ’s behavior sAN(θ) = (1− γ − β)
∑∞
t=0(γ + β)
tEP [θt|θ0 = θ] is influenced less by her own type
and more by her matches’ and higher-order matches’ characteristics, and the latter exhibit
less variation across agents than their own types. However, under assortativity neglect, agents
mistakenly believe that matches’ characteristics do not feature any variation across agents,
which other things equal, would lead them to expect even less local action dispersion than
actual. To maintain coherency and observational consistency, they compensate by perceiving
higher type dispersion.
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Remark 3 (Perceptions of income inequality). As Hauser and Norton (2017) summarize in
a recent survey, a growing empirical literature documents that “people around the world hold
incorrect perceptions of [income] inequality in their country—but with variation. In the US
and United Kingdom, for example, underestimation of inequality is relatively common, while
overestimation occurs in other countries, such as France and Germany.” Cross-country differ-
ences in perceived inequality are often at odds with actual levels of inequality; e.g., Niehues
(2014) finds higher perceived levels of inequality in France and Germany than in the US and
UK, despite the fact that actual inequality is greater in the latter two countries.
Based on the premise that people draw inferences about inequality by observing their peers’
consumption patterns and neglecting assortativity, our analysis provides a theoretical lens for
understanding how cross-country variations in perceived inequality might be influenced by
societal features other than actual inequality. For instance, our above findings suggest that
ceteris paribus, perceived inequality might be higher in countries with stronger social confor-
mity tendencies and/or less socioeconomic segregation; that both under- and overestimation
of inequality is possible depending on the relative strength of these two features;35 and that
cross-country differences in these features can lead perceived inequality to be higher in more
equal countries than less equal ones.36 N
Next, we show that while the false consensus effect implies that perceived type means µ̂θ :=
EF̂θ [θ
′] are increasing in own type θ, coordination motives weaken this effect: The distribution
of µ̂θ in the population (i.e., when θ is distributed according to F ) is less dispersed the higher
γ + β, and under a regularity condition, perceived type means converge to the true mean as
γ + β → 1. Again, this result matters not only quantitatively, but has qualitative implications
for how agents perceive their own position relative to the mean, which we show might affect
society’s demand for redistribution.
Proposition 6 (Dispersion of perceived type means). Fix any P and β1 + γ1 ≤ β2 + γ2. Let
M̂ i denote the population distribution of perceived type means µ̂θ under the coherent ANE at
35This finding might also help understand empirically documented misperceptions in other contexts, e.g.,
why it might be possible for people to overestimate political attitude polarization in society (as documented by
Ahler, 2014; Westfall, Van Boven, Chambers, and Judd, 2015) even if political attitudes among their peers are
more homogenous than in society as a whole.
36Careful empirical analysis of these predictions is beyond the scope of this paper, but we note that in the case
of the US/UK vs. France/Germany they may enjoy some empirical support: First, several studies document
higher socioeconomic segregation in the US (and to a lesser extent the UK) than in continental Europe (e.g.,
Musterd, 2005; Quillian and Lagrange, 2016). Second, an anti-conformism measure that has been employed
in cross-country comparisons in economics (e.g., Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011) and is known to correlate
highly with anti-conformist behavior in lab experiments (Bond and Smith, 1996) is Hofstede’s “individualism
index” (Hofstede, 2001); this ranks the US (91 out of 100) and UK (89) among the least conformist countries
and France (71) and Germany (67) as somewhat more conformist (cf. https://www.hofstede-insights.com/
product/compare-countries).
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(P, βi, γi). Then M̂1 is a mean-preserving spread of M̂2. Moreover, if limt→∞ EP [θt|θ0 = θ] =
EF [θ′], then limγ+β→1 µ̂θ = EF [θ′].
Under coherent ANE, θ’s perceived type mean is equal to her local action average, µ̂θ =
EP [sAN(θ′)|θ]. Hence, Proposition 6 follows from the preceding observation that stronger coor-
dination motives lead to less dispersed ANE behavior. As noted, the higher γ + β, the more is
each agent’s behavior influenced by her more distant t-step ahead matches. Thus, if expected
t-step ahead matches approximate the population mean as t → ∞, then θ’s perceived mean
converges to the truth as γ+β → 1. The requirement that limt→∞ EP [θt|θ0 = θ]→ EF [θ′] holds
in all examples in this paper; Appendix C.6.1 provides a simple sufficient condition, capturing
that the matching technology is not too local and society is well connected.
In Example 3, symmetry of the Gaussian environment yields perceived means that are a
convex combination of the true mean and agents’ own types, so that (i) all agents correctly
perceive which side of the mean they are on; (ii) perceived positions θ− µ̂θ relative to the mean
are increasing in θ. Example 4 shows that in asymmetrically segregated societies both (i) and
(ii) can be violated. However, by Proposition 6, the stronger coordination motives are relative
to other fundamentals such as assortativity, the less severe are these violations.
Example 4 (Perceived position relative to the mean). Consider the following partitional so-
ciety: With probability 2
3
, θ is drawn from a “lower class” of types distributed uniformly on
ΘL = [0, 60], and with probability 13 , θ belongs to the “upper class” distributed uniformly on
ΘH = [60, 540]. For each θ ∈ Θi, θ’s match is drawn uniformly from her own class Θi with
probability ρi, and is drawn uniformly from the other class with probability 1 − ρi, where
ρL =: ρ ∈ [23 , 1] and ρH = 2ρ− 1 to ensure assortativity and symmetry.
The true type mean is 120. In the coherent ANE,37 all lower class types perceive the mean
to be µ̂L ∈ [30, 120] and upper class types perceive µ̂H ∈ [120, 300], where Proposition 6 implies
that µ̂L is increasing and µ̂H is decreasing in γ+β; see Figure 3.38 Whenever γ+β is sufficiently
small and the sorting parameter ρ is sufficiently large, then µ̂L < 60. Thus, for all θL ∈ (µ̂L, 60)
and θH ∈ (60, µ̂H), we have θL− µ̂L > 0 > θH− µ̂H ; that is, the upper range of lower class types
misperceive themselves to be above average, while the lower range of upper class types perceive
themselves to be below average (incorrectly for θH ∈ (120, µ̂H)). By contrast, as γ+β → 1, both
µ̂L and µ̂H tend to the true mean 120, so that agents have more and more accurate perceptions
of their position relative to mean. N
37ANE actions can be calculated as sAN (θ) = 30((γ+β)(12ρ−11)−1)(γ+β)(3ρ−2)−1 + (1− γ − β)(θ − 30) for each θ ∈ ΘL and
sAN (θ) = 60((γ+β)(6ρ−1)−5)(γ+β)(3ρ−2)−1 + (1 − γ − β)(θ − 300) for each θ ∈ ΘH . The corresponding perceptions are given
by µ̂L =
30((γ+β)(3ρ−2)+9ρ−10)
(γ+β)(3ρ−2)−1 and µ̂H =
60((γ+β)(15ρ−10)−9ρ+4)
(γ+β)(3ρ−2)−1 .
38Note that µ̂L (µ̂H) is also decreasing (increasing) in ρ. In general, analogous to Proposition 6, it can be
shown that the distribution M̂ of perceived type means is mean-preserving spread increasing in the %MA-order
over interaction structures C.
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Remark 4 (Preference for redistribution). Several recent empirical and theoretical studies
emphasize that people’s misperceptions of income distributions might affect a society’s demand
for redistribution.39 Using a simple version of Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) majority voting
model as an illustration, Appendix E.2 suggests two ways in which our findings add to this
point. First, assortativity neglect can affect the identity of the decisive voter: While under
correct perceptions the implemented redistribution scheme is the one preferred by the median
income type, this need not hold when agents’ perceived positions relative to the mean are
nonmonotonic (as in Example 4). Second, both the identity of the decisive voter and her
demand for redistribution are shaped not only by the true income distribution, but also depend
systematically on coordination motives and assortativity. In Example 4, assortativity neglect
reduces demand for redistribution relative to correct perceptions, and completely eliminates
demand for redistribution as γ + β → 0 and ρ→ 1. N
4.3 Limits on Coherent Misperceptions
Proposition 4 showed that in any environment, there is a coherent equilibrium in which all
agents suffer from assortativity neglect (i.e., hold perception Ĉθ = CI). The following result
provides a converse: For any interaction structure Ĉ other than CI and any type θ, there are
environments in which θ cannot sustain perception Ĉ in any coherent equilibrium. For this
result, we impose the following mild regularity requirement: We call an interaction structure Ĉ
regular if there exists some y ∈ (0, 1) such that |{x ∈ (0, 1) : Ĉ(x|x) = y}| = 1.40
Proposition 7. Fix any regular Ĉ 6= CI and any θ. There exists (P, γ, β) such that all coherent
equilibria satisfy Ĉθ 6= Ĉ.
To see the idea, just as for Proposition 4, first consider rationalizing an arbitrary action
distribution Ĥ as Nash. As summarized by (8), in order for Ĥ to be Nash at some perceived
society (F̂ , Ĉ), observed action dispersion must be consistent with the type dispersion and vari-
ation in local coordination incentives implied by (F̂ , Ĉ). The key difference with Proposition 4
is that if Ĉ 6= CI , then coordination incentives do vary across agents. Indeed, for some ac-
tion distributions Ĥ, coordination incentives across agents will differ by more than their action
39Cruces, Perez-Truglia, and Tetaz (2013); Engelhardt and Wagener (2015); Gimpelson and Treisman (2018);
Niehues (2014) find empirically that people’s perceptions of income inequality or of their own income quantile
better predict their attitudes to redistribution than the actual income distribution. In an endogenous sorting
model, Windsteiger (2018) assumes agents underestimate differences across income classes and shows that this
reduces demand for redistribution; in contrast with Appendix E.2, the median income voter is decisive in her
setting and coordination motives play no role as agents draw inferences from observed types rather than actions.
40Function x 7→ Ĉ(x|x) maps each quantile x to its “local quantile” under Ĉ, i.e., to the fraction of its matches
with quantile below its own. Regularity rules out that this function oscillates arbitrarily, requiring there to be at
least one value y that is achieved exactly once. This is weaker than the requirement that the map is monotone,
which is satisfied under both Gaussian interactions (Example 1) and under Ĉ = CI .
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differences, making it impossible to rationalize Ĥ regardless of the perceived type distribution
F̂ .41 The proof of Proposition 7 builds on this observation, exhibiting environments (P, γ, β) in
which in any coherent equilibrium, θ cannot rationalize her perceived global action distribution
under perception Ĉ.
Propositions 4 and 7 capture a sense in which assortativity neglect is a misperception that
is especially simple to sustain: While assortativity neglect allows agents to only reason about
others’ intrinsic characteristics, any other misperception requires taking into account variations
in coordination incentives, and in some environments this will lead to violations of coherency.
Of course, in any fixed environment (P, γ, β), there may be scope for many coherent perceptions
other than assortativity neglect (notably, the correct perception Ĉ = C). Nevertheless, as the
following example illustrates, the same logic as above can imply upper bounds on how much
assortativity agents can perceive in a given environment:
Example 5 (Upper bounds on perceived assortativity). Consider the same setting as in Sec-
tion 1.1 with three types θh > θm = 0 > θl, but drop the symmetry assumption to allow for








Since there are no global coordination incentives, it is immediate from Definition 2 that true









] about ρ the middle-class type can sustain in a coherent
equilibrium. By observational consistency, θm knows the three equilibrium action levels ai =
sNE(θi). Moreover, θm knows her own type. However, θm might hold misperceptions about
rich and poor types, perceiving them to be θ̂h and θ̂l, as long as perceived types continue to be
ordered by
θ̂h > θm = 0 > θ̂l.
43 (9)
Consider the actual and perceived action differences between the rich and middle-class. By
the best-response condition, the actual difference is given by
ah − am =
1
2







)(ah − al).︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆(local coordination incentives)
(10)
41Concretely, pick x > y such that the distribution Ĉ(·|x) of x’s matches strictly stochastically dominates that
of y. Then consider an action distribution Ĥ whose xth and yth quantiles are very similar (Ĥ−1(x)−Ĥ−1(y) ≈ 0)
but such that x’s matches on average take substantially higher actions than y’s matches. In this case, it is
impossible to satisfy (8) regardless of F̂ , because x and y’s coordination incentives already differ by more than
their actions.
42The same logic extends to general γ, β; see Appendix D.2.2.
43(9) must hold because θ̂i is the type to whom θm attributes action ai (i.e., ai = ŝθm(θ̂i)), and under
coherency θm’s perceived strategy profile ŝθm is increasing in types.
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At the same time, the coherency condition requires θm to believe that ah is a best response for
θ̂h under sorting parameter ρ̂, which implies a perceived gap of
ah − am =
1
2





)(ah − al). (11)
Combining (10) and (11) and the symmetric conditions for action differences between the poor
and middle-class yields
θ̂h − θh = (ρ− ρ̂)(ah − al) = θl − θ̂l. (12)
If θm underestimates sorting, i.e., ρ̂ ≤ ρ, then the fact that ah > al implies that θm overestimates
θh and underestimates θl (i.e., θ̂h ≥ θh and θ̂l ≤ θl). This is always consistent with the ordering
restriction (9). By contrast, if ρ̂ > ρ, then θm underestimates θh and overestimates θl, and
if ρ̂ is too great, her perceived types θ̂h and θ̂l might violate (9). This typically implies an
upper bound ρ̄ on θm’s sustainable perceptions ρ̂ ∈ [13 ,
2
3
]. Specifically, assuming θh ≥ −θl, the





.44 For ρ = 1
2
, θl = −10, and θh = 190,




. As θh →∞, ρ̄ shrinks to ρ, so that underestimating ρ is always
sustainable but limits on coherent overestimation can be arbitrarily tight. N
The above rationalization procedure for ρ̂ < ρ reflects a weaker form of “fundamental at-
tribution error:” θm underestimates (though need not fully neglect) differences in external
circumstances across agents, and compensates by overattributing behavior differences to intrin-
sic characteristics. The example suggests that while this rationalization procedure is always
internally consistent (i.e., coherent), the same need not be true for the opposite bias of overesti-
mating environmental differences. Supplementary Appendix D.2.2 shows how this logic extends
to general settings.
5 Discussion
We briefly discuss several extensions of our analysis and review related literature.
5.1 Extensions
5.1.1 Hybrid model and negative externalities of assortativity neglect
Under ANE, all agents suffer from assortativity neglect. More realistically, some agents might
be less prone to misperception than others, for example due to having access to information
about global (rather than just local) action distributions. As a simple illustration, Appendix D.1
44Indeed, note that ah − al = 12 (θh − θl) + (ρ −
1
3 )(ah − al), yielding ah − al =
θh−θl
2( 43−ρ)
. Combining (12), (9)
and θh ≥ −θl then yields the upper bound ρ̄. An analogous bound can be obtained if θh < −θl.
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considers the following hybrid model: Independently of types, only fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of agents
suffer from assortativity neglect (subject to the best-response and observational consistency
requirements in Definition 2), while the remaining share of agents best-respond to correct per-
ceptions about the strategy profile and society. We show that equilibrium strategies of both
groups again admit Markov process representations that generalize those for ANE and Nash,
based on which all main results extend.
Notably, while behavior among assortativity neglect agents is more dispersed than among
correct agents, a greater fraction of assortativity neglect agents exacerbates action dispersion
among both groups: Just as in Proposition 1, best responses against any fixed monotone strategy
are more dispersed among assortativity neglect agents, because the false consensus effect leads
higher types to perceive stronger global coordination incentives; but even for correct agents,
the resulting increase in equilibrium action dispersion translates into more dispersed local co-
ordination incentives, and more so the greater α. This captures a sense in which assortativity
neglect agents exert a negative externality on society, as they drive up miscoordination among
all agents.45
5.1.2 Weaker forms of assortativity neglect
For simplicity, we have focused on a rather extreme notion of assortativity neglect, where agents
believe that everyone interacts with a perfectly representative sample of society. Appendix D.2
shows that several of our main insights extend to weaker forms of assortativity neglect. First,
Appendix D.2.1 focuses on the finding that assortativity neglect increases action dispersion
relative to Nash. Whereas under ANE agents’ perceptions of their own match quantile distri-
butions Ĉθ(·|F̂θ(θ)) are the same for all θ (namely uniform on [0, 1]), we show that this finding
generalizes to a weaker notion of assortativity neglect that only requires perceived match dis-
tributions to be “less increasing” in θ than the actual match distributions C(·|F (θ)). Behavior
in this case continues to admit a Markov process representation that nests Nash and ANE. In
Gaussian societies, this weaker form of assortativity neglect is satisfied by a class of coherent
equilibria where agents commonly perceive the correlation coefficient to be any ρ̂ that is less
than the true ρ.
Second, Appendix D.2.2 focuses on coherency of assortativity neglect. Extending our finding
that assortativity neglect is especially easy to rationalize, as it is the only perception of the
interaction structure that agents can coherently sustain across all environments (Propositions 4
and 7), we formalize a sense in which in any fixed environment, it is easier to coherently perceive
lower levels of assortativity than higher levels. The result implies that in any environment, θ can
coherently perceive a continuum range of interaction structures Ĉ that are less assortative than
45This observation contrasts with Jehiel’s (2018) model of investment under selection neglect, where the effect
of misperception is weakened the greater the share of agents who suffer from selection neglect.
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the true interaction structure C. As in Example 5, θ’s rationalization procedure overattributes
differences in actions to differences in types, reflecting a weaker form of “fundamental attribution
error.” By contrast, as Example 5 illustrated, some environments feature limits on how much
θ can overestimate assortativity.
5.1.3 More general best response functions
As in many papers on network games and incomplete information coordination games, we
have focused on linear best response functions. This enabled us to obtain Markov process
representations of Nash and ANE strategies, which played an important role in deriving the
comparative statics results in Sections 3.2 and 4.2. At the same time, several of our main
insights do not rely on the linearity of best responses. Indeed, consider a more general best
response function of the form BRθ(s, P ) = b(θ,Hs,Pθ , H
s,P ), where Hs,P denotes the global
action distribution at (s, P ), map b : R×∆(R)×∆(R)→ R is continuously increasing in θ and
satisfies limθ→∞ b(θ,H,H ′) = ∞ and limθ→−∞ b(θ,H,H ′) = −∞ for any cdfs H,H ′, and we
assume suitable regularity conditions that ensure existence of Nash and ANE. Note that b may
be first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD)-increasing or decreasing in local and global action
distributions, allowing for positive coordination (as in our baseline model) or anticoordination.
Based on the same “fundamental attribution error”-like rationalization procedure as in
Proposition 4, our finding that assortativity neglect is a coherent misperception generalizes:
For any ANE, there is a coherent ANE with the same behavior.46 In comparing Nash and
ANE behavior, a complication is that general best response functions may feature equilibrium
multiplicity. One setting that allows one to side-step this issue are additively separable best-
responses with only global coordination incentives, BRθ(s, P ) = θ+ψ(Hs,P ). Note that in this
case all Nash equilibria are equally dispersive (in terms of the dispersive order). Moreover, if
ψ is FOSD-increasing (positive coordination incentives), then generalizing the logic in Propo-
sition 1, it is straightforward to show that every monotone ANE is more dispersive than any
Nash equilibrium, as higher types perceive higher global coordination motives. By contrast, if ψ
is FOSD-decreasing (anticoordination), then assortativity neglect has the opposite implication
and every monotone ANE is less dispersive than any Nash.






′) := Hs,Pθ (ŝθ(θ
′)). Then H ŝθ,P̂θθ (a) = F̂θ(ŝ
−1
θ (a)) = H
s,P
θ (a), ensuring observational consistency. Under
Ĉθ = CI , this implies that θ’s perceived local and global action distributions both equal H
s,P
θ . Thus, by
construction ŝθ(θ′) = BRθ′(ŝθ, P̂θ), ensuring coherency. Finally, s satisfies the best-response requirement, as




5.1.4 Weaker rationalization/coherency notions
Our coherency notion (Definition 3) requires each agent θ to be able to use her own perceptions
ŝθ, P̂θ to rationalize the behavior ŝθ(θ′) she attributes to any other agent θ′. This suggests a
simple and dogmatic worldview whereby θ believes that all other types θ′ share her percep-
tions ŝθ and P̂θ and best-respond to them. One might consider weakening this requirement
to allow θ to hold higher-order beliefs about other agents’ perceptions. To accommodate this,
Appendix D.3 adapts rationalizable conjectural equilibrium (RCE) (Rubinstein and Wolinsky,
1994; Esponda, 2013) to our setting: Here θ believes that θ′ best-responds to possibly different
perceptions than her own, as long as these perceptions can in turn rationalize the behavior that
θ believes θ′ to observe, where θ′ may again believe her matches to hold different perceptions
from her own, and so on.47
Several of our main insights extend to RCE. First, as RCE is a special case of Definition 2 but
more permissive than coherent equilibrium, assortativity neglect trivially remains sustainable
and leads to the same behavior. Second, we show that the finding that other misperceptions
of C are not sustainable in all environments (Proposition 7) and that any given environment
may feature upper bounds on perceived assortativity (Example 5) also remains valid. How-
ever, whereas the coherent ANE is unique, RCE with assortativity neglect need not pin down
agents’ perceptions. Thus, coherency can be viewed as a refinement of RCE that captures
misperceptions that are especially simple and internally consistent (i.e., don’t require agents to
contemplate higher-order belief disagreement), while also having the virtue of yielding sharp
predictions and comparative statics for agents’ perceived type distributions.
5.2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to a growing literature in behavioral game theory that employs variants
of self-confirming equilibrium to capture agents who, due to misinferences from limited observa-
tional feedback, hold incorrect beliefs about opponents’ behavior.48 While in our setting agents
neglect selection effects arising from assortativity in society, a number of papers consider agents
who neglect selection due to missing feedback about non-implemented projects/transactions,
e.g., in settings of adverse selection (Esponda, 2008), voting (Esponda and Pouzo, 2017), or
47Fudenberg and Kamada (2015) introduce related solution concepts for extensive form games. Lipnowski and
Sadler (2018) consider RCE in which the observation structure is parametrized by a network; in their setting
the network does not affect game payoffs, and they assume that the true network structure and agents’ types
are common knowledge.
48Esponda and Pouzo’s (2016) Berk-Nash equilibrium captures steady-state behavior in general games with
misspecified players. While Berk-Nash allows agents’ beliefs not to perfectly match observed feedback, we follow
self-confirming equilibrium in requiring observational consistency. See also Spiegler (2016, 2017).
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investment (Jehiel, 2018).49 A related inferential bias, “correlation neglect,” underlies cursed
equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin, 2005) and analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel, 2005;
Jehiel and Koessler, 2008), where agents are correct about the type distribution in their popula-
tion but misperceive the correlation between others’ types and actions; these solution concepts
reduce to Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the static private-value environment of this paper.50 Chau-
vin (2018) proposes an equilibrium model of discrimination: Agents belong to observable groups
and each group generates an outcome distribution that depends jointly on members’ individual
traits and on population beliefs about the group, but others’ beliefs about each group are based
on misinferences that attribute observed outcomes purely to members’ traits. This misinference
procedure relates to the “fundamental attribution error” that arises in our setting as an impli-
cation of agents’ rationalization of assortativity neglect.51 None of the aforementioned papers
consider the question of coherency/rationalization of agents’ misperceptions.
While we analyze the equilibrium implications of assortativity neglect for coordination games
in fixed societies, other recent papers consider the effect of related selection biases on endogenous
sorting. Levy and Razin (2017) study the coevolution of sorting into different school types and
beliefs about school quality: agents’ beliefs are shaped by communicating with school peers
while ignoring selection into schools. They characterize when polarized beliefs about school
quality are sustained in the long run. Windsteiger (2018) considers steady-state sorting into
income classes when agents directly observe their peers’ incomes but underestimate income
differences across classes; she shows that this misperception reduces demand for redistribution.
Our result that assortativity neglect is a coherent misperception in all societies can be viewed
as a conceptual foundation for examining its implications in the aforementioned models.
As noted, assortativity neglect can be seen as a form of “projection bias,” where agents
project their own (perceived) match distributions onto other agents’ match distributions. Other
work considers agents who project their tastes onto others, e.g., in the context of auctions (Bre-
itmoser, 2018) and social learning (Gagnon-Bartsch, 2017; Bohren and Hauser, 2018). Madarász
(2012, 2016) considers information projection, where agents overestimate the similarity of oth-
ers’ information. Unlike our paper, these models do not impose observational consistency and
do not consider the coherency of agents’ misperceptions.
Our analysis of linear best response coordination games in a fixed society relates to the
49Osborne and Rubinstein (1998, 2003) consider agents who observe finite but unbiased samples of others’
actions and draw misinferences due to neglecting sampling noise, while our focus is on agents whose samples
are biased but infinite.
50Non-strategic models of selection/correlation neglect include, e.g., Streufert (2000); DeMarzo, Vayanos, and
Zwiebel (2003); Glaeser and Sunstein (2009); Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015); Levy and Razin (2015); Ellis and
Piccione (2017).
51See Kaneko and Matsui (1999) for a related model of discrimination based on inductive game theory.
Ettinger and Jehiel (2010) formalize a notion of “fundamental attribution error” in a bargaining setting.
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literature on static network games.52 Several papers consider network games with random
matching/incomplete information about the network structure, employing Bayes-Nash equilib-
rium or dynamic adjustment processes, e.g., Jackson and Yariv (2007); Galeotti, Goyal, Jackson,
Vega-Redondo, and Yariv (2010) (for a survey, see Section 3.5 of Jackson and Zenou, 2013).53
Two recent papers relate more closely to our focus on agents’ misperceptions of interaction
patterns: Jackson (2018) studies implications of the “friendship paradox,”54 showing that this
leads Nash equilibrium actions under local interactions to be higher than under uniform global
interactions. He also analyzes naive agents who behave as in the local interaction case even
though utilities depend on uniform global interactions. The effect of the friendship paradox is
absent in our setting, because we do not model degree heterogeneity; instead we focus on type
heterogeneity and assortativity, which is absent in Jackson’s model. Battigalli, Panebianco,
and Pin (2018) study self-confirming equilibrium in network games with a focus on learning
dynamics and perceived centrality. Our analysis of the coherency/rationalization of agents’
misperceptions and its implications for agents’ perceived type distributions has no counterpart
in either Jackson (2018) or Battigalli, Panebianco, and Pin (2018).
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes the behavioral implications of assortativity neglect, based on a relaxation of
Nash equilibrium that captures agents whose perceptions are derived only from their assortative
local interactions. We show that ssortativity neglect exacerbates action dispersion in coordina-
tion games, both in any fixed society and by amplifying the impact of social changes (increased
assortativity and type heterogeneity). We also highlight why assortativity neglect might be
an especially persistent form of misperception: A rationalization procedure reminiscent of the
fundamental attribution error makes it possible for agents to coherently sustain assortativity
neglect in any environment, whereas other misperceptions are not always coherent. Finally,
the model provides a lens through which to understand how empirically documented misper-
ceptions of population characteristics (e.g., income or political attitude distributions) may be
shaped by the nature of agents’ social interactions.
Our results have implications for agents’ welfare under misperception: Appendix E.3 shows
that whether or not assortativity neglect makes agents worse off depends on whether θ’s pay-
offs are interpreted objectively (i.e., according to the true behavior in society under ANE), as
52In dynamic local interaction games, it has been highlighted that the effect of the network structure can
be exaggerated when agents are myopic rather than forward-looking (e.g., Section 3.5 of Özgür, 2011). While
reminiscent of our multiplier effect, the mechanism is quite different (forward-looking agents are less sensitive
to local behavioral changes as they anticipate that others will have a chance to change their actions).
53The literature on learning in networks often employs updating heuristics in the style of DeGroot (1974) that
do not require agents to form beliefs about the network structure; see Golub and Sadler (2016) for a survey.
54This refers to the mathematical fact that people’s neighbors on average have higher degrees than themselves.
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might be appropriate if utilities are viewed as material payoffs; or subjectively (according to
θ’s perception of behavior), as might fit a psychological interpretation of utilities. Objectively,
assortativity neglect always Pareto-decreases welfare relative to Nash, but subjective welfare
can be lower or higher than Nash depending on fundamentals.
Finally, while the paper has focused on linear best-response coordination games (and their
generalizations in Section 5.1.3), we note that assortativity neglect might be of relevance in
other population games, both static (e.g., discrete-action games such as political protests) and
dynamic (e.g., social learning; see Section 7.2 of Frick, Iijima, and Ishii, 2019).
Appendix: Main Proofs
This appendix presents our main proofs (Appendix A–B). The supplementary online appendix
presents omitted proofs and additional results (Appendix C–E).
A Preliminaries
A.1 Operator TC induced by interaction structure C
Many of our proofs make use of a particular operator TC over the the space of inverse cdfs
that is induced by any interaction structure C. To define this, let L1 be the space of all
measurable functions f : (0, 1) → R such that
´ 1
0
|f(x)|dx < ∞, endowed with the L1 norm.
Let I ⊆ L1 denote the subset consisting of absolutely continuous55 and weakly increasing






|θ|dF (θ) <∞, so that F−1 ∈ I. Conversely, for any f ∈ I that is
strictly increasing, we have f−1 ∈ F .









all f ∈ L1. The following lemma records some basic properties of TC that we invoke without
reference from now on.
Lemma A.1. Fix any C ∈ C. Then TC is a continuous operator from L1 to L1 with the
following properties:
1. ‖TCf‖ ≤ ‖f‖ for each f ∈ L1.





2. TCf ∈ I for any f ∈ I.











where (TC)t is defined by (TC)0(f) := f and (TC)t+1(f) := (TC)t(TCf) for all f and t.
Proof. See Online Appendix C.1.
A.2 Properties of the mean-preserving spread order over I







for all convex functions φ such that φ ◦ f, φ ◦ g ∈ L1. Note that for F , G ∈ F , F is a mean-
preserving spread of G if and only if F−1 %m G−1. The following characterization of %m is
standard (e.g., Section 3.A.1 in Shaked and Shanthikumar, 2007):
Lemma A.2. Let f, g ∈ I. Then the following are equivalent:







g(x)dx for all y ∈ (0, 1), with equality for y = 0.
We say that a preorder (i.e., reflexive and transitive binary relation) % over I is linear
if for any f, g, h ∈ I and α1, α2 > 0, we have f % g if and only if α1f + α2h % α1g + α2h;
continuous if for any fn → f ∈ I, gn → g ∈ I with fn % gn for each n, we have f % g; and
isotone if f % g implies TCf % TCg for any C ∈ C.
The following lemma verifies that order %m over I satisfies these three basic properties:
Lemma A.3. %m is a preorder over I that is linear, continuous, and isotone.
Proof. See Online Appendix C.1.
Finally, we show that (TC)tf is %m-decreasing in t:
Lemma A.4. (TC)tf %m (TC)t+1f for all t ≥ 0, C ∈ C and f ∈ I.
Proof. See Online Appendix C.1.
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B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Fix any (P, γ, β) with P = (F,C) and let µ := EF [θ]. Since F ∈ F , F−1 ∈ I with F−1 strictly
increasing. Define







for each x ∈ (0, 1). Note that by construction, h = (1−γ−β)F−1 +γTCh+βTCIh. Moreover, h
is strictly increasing, since (TC)tF−1 is weakly increasing for each t ≥ 0 and strictly increasing
for t = 0. Note also that for each t, (TC)tF−1 ∈ I and hence there exists (T tCF−1)′ : (0, 1)→ R+




−1)′(y)dy for all x > x′. Thus, h is absolutely
continuous as





















where the last equality holds by the monotone convergence theorem.





so that s is L1. Moreover, s inherits strict monotonicity and absolute continuity (by the change
of variable theorem) from h and F . Finally, s is a Nash equilibrium because for each type θ
and x = F (θ), we have
s(θ) = h(x) = (1−γ−β)F−1(x)+γTCh(x)+βTCIh(x) = (1−γ−β)θ+γEP [s(θ′) | θ]+βEF [s(θ′)].
To show uniqueness of equilibrium, consider any Nash equilibrium ŝ. Define ĥ(x) :=
ŝ(F−1(x)) for each x. By the best-response condition for ŝ, we have
ĥ = (1− γ − β)F−1 + γTC ĥ+ βTCI ĥ (13)
Iterating (13) yields
ĥ = (1− γ − β)F−1 + βTCI ĥ+ γTC
(
(1− γ − β)F−1 + βTCI ĥ
)
+ γ2(TC)
2ĥ = . . .










for all τ ∈ N. Since we also have h = (1− γ − β)F−1 + γTCh+ βTCIh, the analogous iteration
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holds for h. Thus,






F−1 − βTCI ĥ− F−1 + βTCIh
)
‖+ γτ+1‖(TC)τ+1(ĥ− h)‖

















‖ as τ →∞. But integrating both
sides of (13) with respect to x, we obtain
´ 1
0
ĥ(x)dx = TCI ĥ(y) = µ for each y, and analogously
TCIh(y) = µ from the best-response condition for h. Thus, ‖ĥ− h‖ = 0, whence ŝ = s.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Fix any (P, γ, β). As shown in the main text, the strategy profile sAN in any ANE must satisfy
equation (6). This implies that sAN is the Nash equilibrium at (P, γ′, β′), where γ′ = γ+β and
β′ = 0. Thus, sAN must satisfy (7) by Lemma 1.
To verify the existence of ANE, for each θ, first take an arbitrary F̂θ ∈ F . Then choose any




θ holds. For example,
this can be achieved by setting ŝθ(θ′) = (Hs
AN ,P
θ )
−1(1−F̂θ(θ′)) for each θ′.56 Given observational
consistency, (6) ensures that the best response condition is satisfied.
To show that action distribution HAN is more dispersive than the Nash action distribution
HNE, it suffices to show that sAN(θ)− sAN(θ′) ≥ sNE(θ)− sNE(θ′) for all θ > θ′. But observe
that for all τ , the monotonicity of process P implies EP [θt|θ0 = θ] ≥ EP [θt|θ0 = θ′], whence
0 ≤ (1− β − γ)
τ∑
t=0
((γ + β)t − γt) (EP [θt|θ0 = θ]− EP [θt|θ0 = θ′]) .
By (5) and (7), the RHS converges to (sAN(θ) − sAN(θ′)) − (sNE(θ) − sNE(θ′)) as τ → ∞,
proving the desired claim.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 2
We first show that the more-assortative order %MA is the “dual order” of the mean-preserving
spread order %m:
Lemma B.1. Fix any C1, C2 ∈ C. Then C1 %MA C2 if and only if TC1F−1 %m TC2F−1 for all
F ∈ F .
56To highlight that ANE puts little restriction on perceived strategy profiles, this construction defines a ŝθ that
is decreasing. In general, any perceived strategy profile ŝθ such that defining F̂θ(θ′) := H
sAN ,P
θ (ŝθ((−∞, θ′]))
for all θ′ yields a perceived type distribution F̂θ ∈ F , can be sustained as part of an ANE.
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Proof. First observe that C1 %MA C2 if and only if C1(·|x ≥ y) first-order stochastically domi-
nates C2(· | x ≥ y) for any y ∈ (0, 1). This is because

























′, x)dxdx′ ∀y, z ∈ (0, 1)
⇐⇒ C1(z | x ≥ y) ≤ C2(z | x ≥ y) ∀y, z ∈ (0, 1)












′, x)dx′dx = z for each i = 1, 2.







































′, x)dxf(x′)dx′, ∀y ∈ (0, 1).
Since the set of all F−1 with F ∈ F consists of all L1, strictly increasing and absolutely
continuous functions on (0, 1), this implies that TC1F−1 %m TC2F−1 holds for all F ∈ F if and
only if C1(· | x ≥ y) first-order stochastically dominates C2(· | x ≥ y) for any y ∈ (0, 1). By the
first paragraph, this is equivalent to C1 %MA C2.
Proof of Proposition 2. (1) ⇒ (2): Suppose that C1 %MA C2 and consider any F, γ, β. Let
f := F−1, which is in I since F ∈ F . We first show by induction that (TC1)tf %m (TC2)tf for
all t. For t = 1 this is true by Lemma B.1. Suppose the claim holds for some t ≥ 1. Then
(TC1)
t+1 f = TC1 (TC1)
t f %m TC1 (TC2)
t f %m TC2 (TC2)
t f = (TC2)
t+1f,
where the first comparison follows from the inductive hypothesis by isotonicity of %m, and the
second one holds by Lemma B.1. Thus, by transitivity of %m, we have (TC1)
t+1 f %m (TC2)
t+1 f ,
as required.
















































Thus, by continuity and linearity of %m, we have















where µ = EF [θ]. Thus, HNE1 is a mean-preserving spread of HNE2 at (F, γ, β).
(2) ⇒ (3): Immediate from the fact that the ANE action distribution at (P, γ, β) coincides
with the Nash action distribution at (P, γ + β, 0).
(3) ⇒ (1): Let hF,Ci,γ,β denote the inverse of the ANE action distribution at (F,Ci, γ, β).


































tf → TCif . Thus, by continuity of %m, (14) yields
TC1f % TC2f . As this is true for all f = F−1, we have C1 %MA C2 by Lemma B.1.
(1) ⇔ (4): We first show that (1) implies (4). By the proof of “(1)⇒ (2),” we have (TC1)tF−1 %m
(TC2)












as (γ + β)t ≥ γt ≥ 0 and by linearity of %m. Then linearity and continuity of %m also imply
(1− γ − β)
∑∞
t=0 ((γ + β)
t(TC1)
t + γt(TC2)
t)F−1 + βEF [θ]
1−γ




t + (γ + β)t(TC2)
t)F−1 + βEF [θ]
1−γ .
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By monotonicity of equilibrium strategies, this yields for all θ∗ that
EF [sAN1 (θ) + sNE2 (θ)|θ ≥ θ∗] ≥ EF [sNE1 (θ) + sAN2 (θ)|θ ≥ θ∗],
which is equivalent to the first inequality in (4). The second inequality follows from (2), which
is implied by (1) as we have seen above.
To see that (4) implies (1), note that the second inequality in (4) implies (2). Thus (1)
follows from the above proofs.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The following characterization of CI is used in the proofs of both Propositions 4 and 7.
Lemma B.2. For any Ĉ ∈ C, γ > 0 and β ≥ 0, the following are equivalent:
1. Ĉ = CI .
2. For any action distribution Ĥ ∈ F , there exists a type distribution F̂ such that Ĥ is the
Nash action distribution at (F̂ , Ĉ, γ, β).
Moreover, if (2) holds then for every Ĥ the corresponding F̂ is unique.
Proof. Fix any Ĉ ∈ C, γ > 0 and β ≥ 0. Note first that by the proof of Lemma 1, for any
action distribution Ĥ ∈ F and type distribution F̂ ∈ F , Ĥ is the Nash action distribution at
(F̂ , Ĉ, γ, β) if and only if




Ĥ−1(z)dz for all x ∈ (0, 1). (15)
(1) ⇒ (2): Suppose Ĉ = CI and consider any action distribution Ĥ ∈ F . Define a type
distribution F̂ by F̂−1(x) := 1
1−γ−β
(




for each x. Since Ĥ ∈ F , it
follows that F̂−1 is L1, strictly increasing, and absolutely continuous, so that F̂ ∈ F . Moreover,




Ĥ−1(z)dz, so by (15), Ĥ is the Nash action distribution
at (F̂ , Ĉ,γ, β).
(2) ⇒ (1): We prove the contrapositive. Suppose that Ĉ 6= CI . We will construct an action
distribution Ĥ for which there is no type distribution F̂ such that Ĥ is the Nash action distri-
bution at (F̂ , Ĉ, γ, β). To do so, note first that since Ĉ is assortative and Ĉ 6= CI , there exists
x ∈ (0, 1) such that Ĉ(x | z) is weakly decreasing and non-constant in z. Thus, there exist
y, y′ ∈ (0, 1) with y > y′ such that Ĉ(x | y) < Ĉ(x | y′). Moreover, we can assume that either
(i) y > y′ ≥ x or (ii) x > y > y′.57
57Indeed, either there exists y > x such that Ĉ(x|y) > Ĉ(x|x), in which case (i) holds setting y′ = x. Or
Ĉ(x|z) ≤ Ĉ(x|x) for all z, in which case the fact that Ĉ(x|z) is non-constant in z yields some y′ < x such that
Ĉ(x|y′) < Ĉ(x|x) and continuity yields y ∈ (y′, x) such that Ĉ(x|y′) < Ĉ(x|y); thus, (ii) is satisfied.
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Let 1[x,1) denote the indicator function on [x, 1), and let (Ĥn)n be a sequence of action
distributions in F such that (Ĥ−1n )n is uniformly bounded and Ĥ−1n (z) → 1[x,1)(z) for all







→ Ĉ(x|y′)− Ĉ(x|y) > 0. Hence, setting Ĥ = Ĥn for some
sufficiently large n, we have







But then, if Ĥ were the Nash action distribution under (F̂ , Ĉ, γ, β) for some type distribution
F̂ , the best-response condition (15) would imply that











This is impossible since y > y′.
For the moreover part, if Ĥ is the Nash action distribution at (F̂ , CI , γ, β), then by (15),
Ĥ−1(x) = (1− γ − β)F̂−1(x) + (γ + β)
´
Ĥ−1(z) dz for all x. This uniquely pins down F̂ .
Proof of Proposition 4. Observe that (s, (ŝθ, F̂θ, CI)θ∈Θ) is a coherent ANE if and only if
(i) s is given by (7) (by Proposition 1), (ii) for each θ, Hs,Pθ is the Nash equilibrium action
distribution under (F̂θ, CI) and ŝθ is the corresponding strategy profile.
Therefore, by Lemma B.2, it suffices to show thatHs
AN ,P
θ ∈ F for each θ where sAN is defined
by (7). Note that sAN coincides with the Nash equilibrium at (P, γ′, β′), where γ′ = γ + β and
β′ = 0. Thus, (sAN)−1 is strictly increasing and absolutely continuous. By monotonicity of
sAN , Hs
AN ,P
θ (a) = P ((s
AN)−1(a)|θ) for each a ∈ sAN(Θ). Since P (θ′|θ) is absolutely continuous
and strictly increasing in θ′ on Θ, Hs
AN ,P
θ (a) is absolutely continuous (by the change of variable
theorem) and strictly increasing in a ∈ sAN(Θ).
Since sAN is L1 with respect to F ,
´ ´
|sAN(θ′)|dP (θ′|θ)dF (θ) =
´
|sAN(θ)|dF (θ) < ∞.
Thus, there exists Θ∗ ⊆ Θ such that Θ \ Θ∗ has Lebesgue measure zero and for every θ ∈ Θ∗,´
|sAN(θ′)|dP (θ′|θ) < ∞. Hence, Hs
AN ,P
θ is L
1 for all θ ∈ Θ∗. As Hs
AN ,P
θ is FOSD-monotonic
in θ, this implies that Hs
AN ,P
θ is L
1 for every θ ∈ Θ.59







)n if z ≤ x
1
n(1−x) (z − 1) + 1 if z > x.























θ′′ (a) <∞. If θ = sup Θ (the case
θ = inf Θ is analogous), then suppHs
AN ,P





















θ (a) <∞ for any θ′ ∈ Θ∗.
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B.5 Proof of Proposition 7
Fix any θ and any regular Ĉ ∈ C with Ĉ 6= CI . Fix an arbitrary γ > 0 and let β = 0. We will
find a society (F,C) such that no coherent equilibrium at (F,C, γ, β) satisfies Ĉθ = Ĉ.
Note first that by regularity of Ĉ, there exists z ∈ (0, 1) such that {x ∈ (0, 1) : Ĉ(x|x) =
z} = {x̂} for some x̂. Moreover, since Ĉ admits a positive density on (0, 1)2, we have that
Ĉ(· | x̂) is a bijection from (0, 1) to (0, 1). Let Ĉ−1x̂ denote its inverse. As in the proof of the
“(2) =⇒ (1)” direction of Lemma B.2, we can find an action distribution Ĥ ∈ F and some
y > y′ such that







Note that setting H̃−1(x) := Ĥ−1(Ĉ−1x̂ (x)) for all x ∈ (0, 1) defines another action cdf H̃ ∈ F .
Moreover, by the “(1) =⇒ (2)” direction of Lemma B.2, there exists a type distribution F̃ ∈ F
such that H̃ is the Nash action distribution under (F̃ , CI , γ, β). Since F̃ ∈ F , there exists some
ν ∈ R such that F̃ (θ+ ν) = z. Define a new type distribution F by F (θ′) := F̃ (θ′+ ν) for each
θ′. Then the Nash action distribution H at (F,CI , γ, β) satisfies
H−1(x) = H̃−1(x) + ν for all x ∈ (0, 1). (18)
We claim that in environment (F,CI , γ, β), there exists no coherent equilibrium with Ĉθ =
Ĉ. Indeed, suppose for a contradiction that there is a coherent equilibrium with Ĉθ = Ĉ, where
the corresponding true strategy profile is s and θ’s perceived type distribution and perceived
strategy profile are F̂θ and ŝθ. Since β = 0, the strategy profile s at this equilibrium coincides
with the Nash equilibrium profile (see Lemma D.4). Hence, the true action distribution is
given by H. Let Ĝθ = F̂θ ◦ ŝ−1θ denote θ’s perceived global action distribution. We will derive
a contradiction from the coherency requirement that Ĝθ is the Nash action distribution at
(F̂θ, Ĉ, γ, β).
To this end, note first that θ’s perceived type quantile F̂θ(θ) is given by x̂. Indeed, θ’s true
quantile is F (θ) = z. Hence, under the true interaction structure CI , the fraction of θ’s matches
that play an action below s(θ) is CI(z|z) = z. But by observational consistency, θ must be
correct about this fraction; that is, θ must believe fraction z of her matches to have types below
θ, i.e., Ĉ(F̂θ(θ)|F̂θ(θ)) = z. By choice of z, this implies F̂θ(θ) = x̂.
Given this, we have the following relationship between θ’s perceived local and global action
distributions H ŝθ,P̂θθ and Ĝθ:
H ŝθ,P̂θθ
−1
(x) = Ĝ−1θ (Ĉ
−1
x̂ (x)) for all x. (19)
Indeed, since θ perceives her own quantile to be x̂ and the interaction structure to be Ĉ, θ
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perceives the xth quantile among her matches to correspond to quantile Ĉ−1x̂ (x) in the overall
population. Hence, θ’s perception of the xth action quantile among θ’s matches (i.e, the LHS)
is the same as θ’s perception of the Ĉ−1x̂ (x)th action quantile in the overall population (i.e., the
RHS).
Moreover, since the true interaction structure is CI , θ’s true local action distribution Hs,Pθ is
given by the global action distributionH. Hence, by observational consistency, we haveH ŝθ,P̂θθ =
H. Combining this with (19) yields that Ĝ−1θ (Ĉ
−1
x̂ (x)) = H
−1(x) for all x; or equivalently
(substituting x = Ĉ(q|x̂)) that
Ĝ−1θ (q) = H
−1(Ĉ(q|x̂)) = H̃−1(Ĉ(q|x̂)) + ν = Ĥ−1(q) + ν for all q ∈ (0, 1),
where the final two equalities follow from (18) and the definition of H̃ above. Combining this
with equation (17), we have that Ĝ−1θ (y)− Ĝ
−1
θ (y
′) is equal to













Since Ĝθ is the Nash action distribution at (F̂θ, Ĉ, γ, β), the best-response condition (15) then
implies that F̂−1θ (y) < F̂
−1(y′). This contradicts the fact that y > y′.
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